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PIERCE v. COOK & CO.: CHANGE IN STATE
LAW AS A GROUND FOR RELIEF FROM
A FEDERAL JUDGMENT
A supervening change in controlling law generally is not
held to justify relief from a final judgment under rule 60(b)' of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit relied on clause (6) of rule 60(b), however, to
grant relief on this ground in Pierce v. Cook & Co.,2 in which
parties to a common catastrophe litigated to different conclu-
sions in federal and state courts due to earlier resolution in the
federal courts and a subsequent change of the controlling prece-
dent in the state courts.
Pierce involved a vehicular accident which occurred on
January 11, 1968, in Oklahoma. Ted Pierce was killed and pas-
sengers in his car were injured in a collision with an independent
contractor who was transporting wheat for defendant-appellee
Cook. Pierce's widow, Claudiatte Pierce, and Pierce's passengers,
Davis and Ellenwood, brought suit against Cook in an Oklahoma
state court. On Cook's motion, each suit was removed to federal
court on grounds of diversity of citizenship. The Davis suit was
dismissed on plaintiff's motion and refiled in state court by co-
guardians of Davis, a minor. Because the guardianship de-
stroyed diversity, it precluded removal to federal court.
Claudiatte Pierce and Ellenwood were unsuccessful on the merits
'FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) now provides in part:
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been dis-
covered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other mis-
conduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its opera-
tion.
2 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Jan. 19,
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in the federal district court, which awarded Cook summary
judgment on the basis of Oklahoma precedent established in
Marion Machine, Foundry & Supply Co. v. Duncan;3 the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. 4 The decision of the circuit court became final
in January, 1971. The state trial court in the Davis suit also
granted Cook summary judgment, finding Marion Machine
controlling. On appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically
overruled Marion Machine and remanded the suit for jury trial.5
The case was then settled favorably to plaintiff Davis.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court judgment became final in
May, 1974. In November, 1974, Claudiatte Pierce and Ellen-
wood filed a rule 60(b) motion with the Tenth Circuit, seeking
relief from the judgment of that court as a matter of law. The
Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the movants were enti-
tled to relief from the circuit court's judgment under rule
60(b)(6) because the federal courts in which they were forced to
litigate treated them substantially differently than the state su-
preme court treated another person injured in the same acci-
dent, contrary to the command of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins6 and
the interest of justice. The case was remanded to the district
court which was directed, upon movants' filing of the motion
below, to consider the rule 60(b)(6) motion as one for relief from
the trial court's judgment in light of the supervening Oklahoma
decision and the opinion of the Tenth Circuit.
Thus Pierce presents the question whether rule 60(b)(6) re-
lief from a federal judgment in a diversity case is required either
by the Erie doctrine or by the need to correct the inequity of
divergent results on the same or similar facts, when the state law
relied upon by the federal court is subsequently altered.
I. RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(6) GENERALLY
When relief may properly be granted under clause (6) of
rule 60(b) depends on the function of the rule as a whole and on
the relationship of clause (6) to the preceding five clauses. Rule
60(b) in its present form7 embodies a balancing of the conflicting
3 187 Okla. 160, 101 P.2d 813 (1940).
4 Pierce v. Cook & Co. 437 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1970).
5 Hudgens v. Cook Industries, Inc., 521 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973).
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Compare text accompanying notes 59-66 infra with text accom-
panying notes 93-121 infra.
7 Note I supra. The substance of rule 60(b) in its present form is the product of the
1946 amendments. In 1948, the rule was insignificantly amended by the substitution of
its present statutory reference, "Title 28 U.S.C § 1655," for its former citation, "Section
57 of the Judicial Code, U.S.C., Title 28, § 118." See J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES
PAMPHLET pt. 1, at 1071 (1975) [hereinafter cited as RULES PAMPHLET].
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values of finality of judgments and provision of relief from
judgments when justice so requires.8 Original rule 60(b) estab-
lished a six-month limit on the commencement of proceedings
for seeking relief from final judgments. 9 Although the rule ef-
fectively lengthened the period of time during which a court had
control over its judgments, the grounds for relief were not ex-
panded beyond those previously existing at common law. 10 The
courts soon devised ways to evade the six-month time limitation
imposed by rule 60(b). Rule 6(b), allowing courts to extend time
limits stipulated by the rules, was applied by the courts to rule
60(b); the "inherent power" of courts over their judgments was
invoked when the courts wished to grant relief unavailable
under the rule; and the ancillary remedies existing prior to the
enactment of the Federal Rules were read into rule 60(b). 11
In the 1946 amendments, the Advisory Committee estab-
lished "reasonable time" limits, not to exceed one year, for mo-
tions under clauses (1)-(3) while motions under clauses (4)-(6)
were made subject only to a "reasonable time" requirement.
1 2
Rule 6(b) was amended to prohibit the extension of the max-
imum time periods prescribed by rule 60(b). 13 Relief previously
available by ancillary remedies was incorporated into rule
60(b).1 4 Under the 1946 amendments, relief was to be obtained
exclusively by motion under one of the six clauses of rule 60(b)
or by an independent action to enjoin enforcement of the
judgment.' 5 The sixth clause, upon which the Tenth Circuit re-
lied in Pierce, is a residual clause which was inserted to provide
relief in unforeseen circumstances.
16
According to the prevailing interpretation of rule 60(b)(6),
8 Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 927 (1970); 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.18[2], at 203 (2d ed. 1975); Com-
ment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposalfor General Reform, 60 CAL L. RaV. 531, 533 (1972).
9 7J. MoORE, supra note 8, 60.09, at 10-10.1.
10 Comment, Civil Procedure-Federal Rules 60(b)(5) & (6)-Applicability to Change of
Law Situation, 44 IowA L. REV. 574, 574-75 (1959).
11 Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief From CivilJudgnents, 61 YALE L.J. 76, 78 (1952). For
a discussion of original rule 60(b), see 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.10-.17 at 10.1-94;
Comment, supra note 8, at 535-37; Comment, Temporal Aspects of the Finality of
Judgments-The Signijficance of Federal Rule 60(b), 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 664, 668-69 (1950).
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.27[3], at 378.
13 See RULES PAMPHLET, supra note 7, at 1076.
14 See 7 J. MOORE, supra note 8, T 60.18[8], at 224-25; 58 MICH. L. REv. 793, 794
(1960). The grounds for relief under clauses (1)-(3) were historically equitable, those
under clauses (4) & (5) were historically legal, while clause (6) "invokes the pure equity
power of the court." Comment, Equitable Powerof a Federal Court to Vacate a FinalJudgnent
for "Any Other Reason Justifying Relief "-Rule 60b(6), 33 Mo. L. REv. 427, 434-35 (1968).
,5 7 J. MOORE, supra note 8, 60.18[8], at 225; Comment, supra note 8, at 537.
16 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.27[2], at 353-54.
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relief cannot be granted under that clause on a ground covered
by any of the first five clauses. In Klapprott v. United States,17 the
first Supreme Court case construing rule 60(b)(6), Justice Black
stated that "the language of the 'other reason' clause, for all
reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power in
courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever
such action is appropriate to accomplish justice."' 8 This view was
reaffirmed by the Court a year later in Ackernann v. United
States,19 this time over Justice Black's dissent.20 Construing clause
(6) and clauses (1)-(5) to be mutually exclusive is consistent with
the scheme of time limits in the whole rule and the wording of
clause (6): If relief could be granted on the same facts under
either clauses (1)-(3) or clause (6), the purpose of the one year
time limitation on clauses (1)-(3) would be undermined, and the
word "other" in clause (6) would be meaningless.
21
17 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). The district court entered a de-
naturalization decree against Klapprott by default. Due to incarceration and illness KIap-
prott had been unable to attend the denaturalization proceedings or to petition for relief
from the decree for more than four years after the issuance of the decree. The district
court dismissed Klapprott's subsequent petition to set aside the judgment because of
laches, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
with directions to determine the veracity of the allegations contained in the petition to
vacate the default judgment.
18 Id. at 614-15.
19 340 U.S. 193 (1950). The district court entered judgments cancelling the naturali-
zation certificates of petitioner, his wife, and a relative. Petitioner and his wife failed to
appeal because of lack of funds. The relative's decree was subsequently reversed on
appeal. Then, more than four years after entry of the judgment against the petitioner, he
petitioned the district court to vacate the judgment of denaturalization. The district court
denied petitioner's rule 60(b) motion for relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts.
20 Repudiating the literal effect of his Klapprott opinion, Justice Black argued that the
specified grounds for relief in rule 60(b)(1)-(5) were not intended to prevent the granting
of similar relief in other situations where justice so requires. Id. at 202-03 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Consistent with Justice Black's dissent, Judge Hand in United States v.
Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953), read rule 60(b)(6) "to provide for situations of
extreme hardship, not only those, if there be any, that subsections (1), (2) and (3) do not
cover, but those that they do." Id. at 333. On rehearing, however, Judge Hand noted the
divergence of his interpretation of rule 60(b)(6) from the majority's reasoning in Klapprott
and retracted the opinion to that extent. Id. at 335.
Not all courts, however, conscientiously adhere to the mutual exclusivity principle.
See, e.g., Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951) (relief
granted on motion under 60(b)(1) and (6) without rejecting either clause); Nelms v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 11 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (relief granted under 60(b)
without identifying a specific clause).
21 Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 626 (Reed, & Jackson, JJ., & Vinson,
C.J., dissenting), miodified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Gambocz v. Ellmyer, 438 F.2d 915, 917
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Alker, 30 F.R.D.
527, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 880 (1963); 7
J. MOORE, supra note 8, 60.27[I], at 343-44.
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The language of rule 60(b)(6) requires not only that the
reason for relief fall outside of the preceding five clauses, but
also that the reason be one "justifying relief." Justice Black's
opinion in Klapprott contains broad language to the effect that
rule 60(b)(6) should be applied to afford relief "whenever such
action is appropriate to accomplish justice. '2 2 Thus, courts com-
monly hold that rule 60(b), and specifically clause (6), should be
interpreted liberally to do justice in particular cases.23 But Justice
Black's opinion also observed that the facts before the Court
presented an "extraordinary situation. '24 The Court later em-
phasized this aspect of the Klapprott case in denying rule 60(b)(6)
relief in Ackerrnann, making an "extraordinary situation" a re-
quirement for rule 60(b)(6) relief.
25
In addition, several general principles must be considered in
determining whether a party should be relieved of a judgment
under rule 60(b)(6) or any of the preceding clauses. Considera-
tion must be given to the principle of finality of judgments;2
6
rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for appeal; 27 justifica-
tion must be shown for failure to resort to other remedies; 28 a
rule 60(b) motion must be made within a reasonable time;29 and
consideration must be given to any prejudice that might result to
the other party,30 to any intervening equities that would make it
unjust to grant relief,3' and to any other factors affecting the
equities of the case.32
22 335 U.S. at 615.
23E.g., Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir.
1963); Erick Rios Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245
(3d Cir. 1951); 7 J. Moont, supra note 8, 60.27[1], at 342.
24 335 U.S. at 613.
25 See, e.g., Wagner v. United States, 316 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1963); Collins v. City
of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958); Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305,
308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See generally Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776 (5th
Cir. 1954).
26 See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950); Collins v. City of
Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958).
27 See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950); Rinieri v. News Syndi-
cate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1967).
28 7 J. Moont, supra note 8, 60.27[l], at 348-49, 60.28[2], at 403; Wham, Federal
District Court Rule 60(b): A Humane Rule Gone Wrong, 49 A.B.A.J. 566 (1963).
29 7 J. MoonE, supra note 8, 1 60.27[3], at 378.
30E.g., Pierre v. Bernuth Lembcke Co., 20 F.R.D. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Comment, supra note 8, at 565.
31 E.g., Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Adams, 58 F. Supp. 579, 581-82 (D. Idaho 1945).
32 7 J. Moona, supra note 8, 60.27[1], at 351.
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II. OPERATION OF THE MUTUAL EXCLUSIVITY
REQUIREMENT IN THE CHANGE OF LAW CONTEXT
A. Implications of the Requirement
Because the reasons for relief under rule 60(b)(6) must be
exclusive of those under clauses (1)-(5), a supervening change of
law must be shown to be outside of the scope of any of the first
five clauses if it is to serve as a ground for relief under clause (6).
Although a grant of relief under any of the six clauses would
bring the same result, the clause relied upon must be deter-
mined. First, strict adherence to the doctrine of mutual exclusiv-
ity could result in a denial of relief when the rule 60(b) motion is
filed after one year from the entry of the judgment, as it was in
Pierce, if the change of law ground were found to be subsumed
under one of the first three clauses. Little practical difference
would result, however, if the change of law ground were covered
by clauses (4) or (5) rather than clause (6), because motions
under these three provisions are subject to the same flexible limit
of "reasonable time." 33 Second, alleged grounds for relief not
enumerated in the first five clauses are subject to the "extraordi-
nary situation" requirement established for rule 60(b)(6) by the
Supreme Court.
3 4
Arguments have been made that a judgment may be set
aside on the ground of a supervening change in controlling law
under clauses (1) and (5) of rule 60(b). As demonstrated below,
these arguments fail to establish that rule 60(b)(6) Telief in a
change of law situation is precluded by the mutual exclusivity
principle.
B. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1)
Professor Moore asserts that relief from judgments because
of a post-judgment change in the applicable law may be available
under 60(b)(1) in a limited class of cases.3 5 Moore's position is
based upon a construction of the word "mistake" in 60(b)(1) that
includes a substantive error of law by the court.36 Original rule
60(b) provided for relief when the moving party had made an
error of law but not when the error was made by the court.
Relief from judicial error was still available by the common law
remedy of the bill of review for error apparent upon the record,
33 Id. 60.27[1], at 346.
31 See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra. See also Wham, supra note 28, at 567.
"' 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.22[3], at 258-67.
36 Id. 60.22[3], at 260.
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left standing by the saving clause of original rule 60(b). Moore
asserts that although the bill of review did not afford relief in a
change of law situation because the error was not apparent upon
the record, new rule 60(b)(1) should not be limited by the prac-
tice under the bill of review because the word "mistake" in the
new rule is broader than the term "error of law apparent upon
the record.'38 In deference to the principle of finality and the
general rule that 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal, Moore
suggests that the definition of "reasonable time," which has an
upper bound of one year for 60(b)(1), should be further limited
so as never to exceed the time allowed for appeal from the
judgment.39 Consequently, a moving party could not circumvent
the time limits for appeal by bringing a rule 60(b) motion after
the time allowed for appeal had expired. The advantage of af-
fording relief under rule 60(b)(1) for judicial error would be the
avoidance of the inconvenience and expense of an appeal when
the trial court is prepared to correct its own error.
40
The question arises whether, in circuits subscribing to
Moore's interpretation of rule 60(b)(1), judgments can be set
aside under rule 60(b)(6) on the basis of a supervening change in
controlling law without violence to the mutual exclusivity princi-
ple. To allow relief after the challenged judgment has been af-
firmed on appeal, as in the Pierce case, would transgress neither
the requirement that rule 60(b) not serve as a substitute for
appeal nor the principle of mutual exclusivity. The first re-
quirement is satisfied because relief is granted only after the
moving party has diligently, though unsuccessfully, pursued his
remedy of appeal. 41 The doctrine of mutual exclusivity is re-
3
7 Id.
3 8 Id. 261.
39 Id. Cases in which rule 60(b) relief was granted under the conditions proposed by
Professor Moore include Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1955) and Oliver v. Monsanto Co., 56 F.R.D. 370 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 514
(5th Cir. 1973).
40 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, $ 60.22(3], at 260.
41 To require the moving party to appeal the judgment in order to qualify for rule
60(b)(6) relief, however, would not be beneficial. If the trial judge has correctly applied
the law that is soon to be changed but still is controlling during the time for appeal,
bringing a futile appeal will accomplish little. See Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426,
437-38 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 431-33 (majority opinion suggesting
that such an appeal must be taken).
Even if an appeal were not required, other principles of law may limit the amount of
time available to a petitioner who has justifiably chosen not to appeal. For example, how
long would such a case remain subjudice? See text accompanying notes 67-90 infra. In the
Pierce case petitioners did bring an appeal; a full discussion of the problems presented by
the failure to appeal is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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spected because the supervening change in law upon which
60(b)(6) relief is based occurred after an appeal was taken and
thus was not in existence during the time prescribed by Moore
for relief under rule 60(b)(1). In addition, unlike the conditions
underlying the traditional bases of relief under clauses (1)-(3),
which are discoverable and hence remediable within one year
after entry of a judgment, at least in theory, a change of law
leading to the motion for relief under clause (6) may not even
materialize until the time limit on the first three clauses has
expired. Therefore, it is fallacious to presume that relief was
available under rule 60(b)(1). Thus a court that construes rule
60(b)(1) to provide relief in a change of law situation before the
time for appeal has run is not necessarily barred by the doctrine
of mutual exclusivity from granting relief under rule 60(b)(6) in
response to a supervening change of law after the judgment has
been appealed.
C. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(5)
The moving parties in Pierce urged rule 60(b)(5) as an alter-
native basis for relief but the majority ignored this argument in
its opinion.4 2 Although the language of the two component
clauses of rule 60(b)(5) may appear at first reading to allow relief
in a change of law situation, such relief is not available on that
ground except in limited situations.
The first clause authorizes relief when "a prior judgment
upon which the challenged judgment is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated . . . . -43 A judgment must have been ex-
plicitly and directly based on a prior reversed judgment to be set
aside under this clause. A change in controlling law after entry
of the judgment does not satisfy this requirement. 44 In reaching
this result, the First Circuit in Lubben v. Selective Service System
45
42 Chief Judge Lewis, dissenting in Pierce, criticized the court's reliance on rule
60(b)(6) when the moving parties sought relief only under rule 60(b)(5). 518 F.2d at 725
(Lewis, C.J., dissenting). The majority, in determining whether the movants presented
facts justifying relief under any of the clauses of rule 60(b) rather then denying relief
because the movants used the wrong nomenclature, followed the better course. See 7 J.
MOORE, supra note 8, 60.18[8], at 216.1 (nomenclature is unimportant); e.g., United
States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 472-73 (4th Cir. 1961) (60(b) relief granted even without a
rule 60(b) motion); In re Cremidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alas. 1953) (60(b) relief
granted on petition for a writ of coram nobis).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
44 Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952); Loucke v. United
States, 21 F.R.D. 305, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Commentsiupra note 10, at 575-77; Note,
Federal Rule 60(b): Finality of Civil Judgments v. Self-Correction by District Court of Judicial
Error of Law, 43 NOTRE DAME LAw. 98, 104 (1967).
45 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).
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described the requisite relationship between the prior and sub-
sequent judgments:
For a decision to be "based on" a prior judgment within
the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5), the prior judgment must
be a necessary element of the decision, giving rise, for
example, to the cause of action or a successful de-
fense .... It is not sufficient that the prior judgment
provides only precedent for the decision.
... [A] change in applicable law does not provide
sufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(5).46
The second relevant clause of 60(b)(5) allows relief from a
judgment when "it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application . . . -47 This provision is
used primarily for relief from permanent injunctions; 48 it en-
compasses cases in which a change of law makes the continuance
of an injunction inequitable. 49 Although this provision is not
limited to equitable decrees, a judgment may not be brought
within its purview unless it has a prospective application.5
Because the Pierce case involved a judgment neither directly
based on a previously reversed judgment nor intended for pro-
spective application, relief under rule 60(b)(5) would not have
been proper. Thus relief under rule 60(b)(6) did not violate the
principle of mutual exclusivity.
III. CHANGE IN APPLICABLE LAW AS A REASON
"JUSTIFYING RELIEF" UNDER RULE 60(b)(6)
A. The Pierce Rationale
Even when the mutual exclusivity test has been satisfied,
rule 60(b)(6) relief must be justified under equitable principles,
51
including a showing of an "extraordinary situation. '5 2 The court
46 Id. at 650 (citations omitted).
47 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
48 Comment, supra note 10, at 576; see Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d
776, 780 (5th Cir. 1954).
49 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.26[4], at 335-36 (especially apt when a federal
injunction is based on state law that has changed).
- 0 Id. 337; see Polities v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 438 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing, argued that relief was appropriate under rule 60(b)(5) because the challenged judg-
ment, a denaturalization decree, determined status affecting future conduct); Note, supra
note 44, at 105.
5' See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
'2 See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
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in Pierce held that the supervening change in state law justified
relief under rule 60(b)(6) because (1) otherwise the inconsistency
of results in the state and federal courts on the same facts in a
diversity case would violate the "outcome determination princi-
ple mandated by Erie v. Tompkins, ' 53 and (2) different treat-
ment by the state and federal courts of persons injured in the
same accident would be unjust.
54
Pierce represents a significant departure from prior in-
terpretations of rule 60(b)(6) in holding that a change in control-
ling law is cause for setting aside a final judgment. Relief in a
change of law situation has been denied even when the applicant
diligently pursued his remedy of appeal 55 or lacked the financial
resources to appeal. 56 Despite considerable equities on the side
of the moving party, the interest in finality of judgments has
prevailed.57 Pierce is all the more remarkable because, rather
than treat the motion before the court as a request for leave to
file a motion for relief with the district court, whose ruling on
the motion would be subject to review only for an abuse of
discretion, the court of appeals granted relief from its judgment
as a matter of law.58 The Pierce rationale, however, provides
shaky support at best for its exceptional holding.
53 Pierce v. Cook & Co. 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1975) (citing Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Compare text accompanying notes 59-66 infra with text
accompanying notes 93-121 infra.
54 518 F.2d at 723. See text accompanying notes 94-112 infra.
15 Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
56 Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); cf. Ackermann v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
11 Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("situation with a
measure of obvious human appeal").
-s 518 F.2d at 722 (majority oponion), 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting), 726 (Seth, J.,
dissenting). It is highly unusual for a circuit court to adjudicate the merits of a rule 60(b)
motion in the first instance. A rule 60(b) motion is addressed to the sound discretion of
the district court. E.g., Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 443 F.2d 796, 799
(10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1961). A question of
law arises when the issue is whether the rule 60(b) motion was made within the time
prescribed by the rule such that the district court had the power to grant relief, or when
relief turns on such questions as the validity of a judgment; but when the decision to
grant relief depends on a discretionary review of the facts of a particular case, the
question is one for the district court. 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.30[1], at 418-19 &
n.13.
After the challenged judgment has been affirmed by a court of appeals, however,
the district court cannot disturb the judgment without leave of the appellate court.
Butcher & Sherrerd v. Welsh, 206 F.2d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 925
(1954). Because the rule 60(b) motion in Pierce was filed with the court of appeals, and
because the grant or denial of relief depended on an appraisal of the facts, the court of
appeals should have treated the motion as a petition for leave to file a motion with the
district court. Tribble v. Bruin, 279 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1960); see United States v. Jacobs,
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B. Reliance on Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
1. Application of the Basic Doctrine
The decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 9 was rendered to
guarantee that any case in federal court only because of diversity
of citizenship would be decided according to the same substan-
tive law by which it would have been decided had it been
brought in state court. If the Pierce court held that Erie required
rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment in the change of law situation
before the court,60 such relief would be called for whenever a
state court changed state law that had been applied by a federal
court in a diversity case and was necessary to its decision. It is
unlikely, however, that Erie requires retroactive application of
state law to federal judgments that have been final for as long as
the judgment in Pierce; and the availability of alternate remedies
during the period in which Erie requires the retroactive applica-
tion of state law61 makes relief under rule 60(b)(6) inapprop-
riate.
For Erie purposes, the Pierce case is indistinguishable from
the more usual circumstances of an unrelated accident case in
which analogous but unconnected suits are brought in state and
federal courts, the federal case is resolved first, and the state
supreme court alters the law applied by the federal court in the
course of adjudicating the state case. Erie itself did not involve a
common catastrophe; nor was it rendered only to ensure that
298 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1961). The cases cited by the majority in Pierce, 518 F.2d at 722,
discuss whether a district court must obtain leave of an appellate court before entertain-
ing a rule 60(b) motion; they do not support the courtes action in hearing the merits of
the motion in the first instance.
59 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
60 The court said: "The outcome determination principle mandated by Erie v.
Tompkins has been violated." 518 F.2d at 723.
Whether Erie requires the retroactive application of a supervening change in state
law in diversity cases is a separate question from whether a federal court must grant rule
60(b) relief in circumstances in which a state court would allow comparable relief from its
own judgment. Rule 60(b) is a valid rule of procedure under the Rule-Making Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1970); granting relief from a federal judgment is determined by the
provisions of the rule, not by state policies concerning relief from state judgments. 7 J.
MooRE, supra note 8, 60.18[8], at 218; 6A id. 60.04[3], at 4049-51; cf. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Thus the issue in Pierce was not whether the state court
would grant relief from its final judgment on the basis of a supervening change in state
law, but whether relief was required on the facts as a matter of federal law. Relief under
rule 60(b), granted to ensure that the currently controlling state substantive law will be
applied, might result ironically in retroactive application of state law in which the state
court itself would not engage. This "procedural" conflict is presumably permissible under
Hanna.
61 See text accompanying notes 68 & 69 infra.
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state substantive law would be applied to suits arising from
common transactions being litigated simultaneously in state and
federal courts. The Pierce holding is unsupported to the extent
that its finding of an "extraordinary situation" is based on a view
that Erie requires relief under rule 60(b)(6) only when a federal-
state divergence emerges from a common catastrophe. 62 If the
majority in Pierce meant not that relief was compelled by Erie,
but only that the underlying policy of Erie of promoting uniform
administration of the laws 63 moved the court to grant relief, then
Pierce would not be as far-reaching.
64
The alternative posed by Judge Barrett in his concurring
opinion in Pierce also fails to comport with Erie. Judge Barrett
suggests that a change in state law should not be available as a
ground for relief to a party who selected the federal forum
voluntarily but only to a party forced to litigate in the federal
courts.65 This argument is faulty if based on Erie and not simply
on equitable considerations. 66 The logical implication of Erie is
that when state law is controlling, the party selecting the federal
forum has the same right to correction of a retrospectively "er-
roneous" application of state law as the party who is in federal
court "involuntarily." Erie determined that the decision whether
to apply state or federal law is a matter of judicial power, not
judicial discretion guided by a sense of fairness or by who
brought suit in which court.
2. Application of the Sub Judice Requirement
In any case, Erie probably does not require vacation of a
federal judgment, erroneous in retrospect because of a super-
vening change in state law, when the decisional change comes as
long after entry of the federal judgment as it did in Pierce.67
62 518 F.2d at 723.
Chief Judge Lewis, dissenting from the decision in Pierce, takes this position:
The factual background of this case is based on a common disaster and ....
I assume that the majority ruling is intended to be limited by this "extraordinary
circumstance." But the driving force of the ruling, the desire to obtain consistent
results in state and federal cases involving state law, to me, seems equally applic-
able to identical accidents .... Id. at 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
Judge Seth, also dissenting in Pierce, expresses the same view: "The argument advanced
by the majority is equally applicable to any diversity case, and the fortuitous circumstance
of one accident makes no legal difference whatever . Id. at 726 (Seth, J., dissenting).
63 304 U.S. at 74-75.
64 See text accompanying notes 93-121 infra.
65 518 F.2d at 724-25 (Barrett, J., concurring).
'6 See text accompanying notes 93-121 infra.
67 The federal judgment became final in January, 1971, and the supervening state
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Under the Supreme Court ruling in Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co.,68 federal courts must apply any recent changes in ap-
plicable state law "until such time as a case is no longer sub
judice.' 69 In Vandenbark, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit7 ° not to reverse the
district court's judgment in a diversity case after the state court
decisions on which the district court relied were overruled by the
state supreme court during the appeal. In reversing the decision
of the Sixth Circuit the Court held:
Until such time as a case is no longer subjudice, the duty
rests upon federal courts to apply state law under the
Rules of Decision statute in accordance with the then
controlling decision of the highest state court. Any
other conclusion would but perpetuate the confusion
and injustices arising from inconsistent federal and state
interpretations of state law.7 1
After Vandenbark it appeared that a case was no longer sub
judice once the judgment of a court of appeals had become final.
Four years later, however, in Huddleston v. Dwyer, 2 the Supreme
Court made clear that recent pronouncements by a state su-
preme court must be applied to federal decisions even after
entry of the judgment of a court of appeals. Petitioners in Hud-
dleston filed a timely petition for rehearing with the Tenth Cir-
cuit after that court affirmed the judgment of the district
court. 73 The petition was denied on September 1, 1943. On De-
cember 17, 1943, petitioners moved for leave by the circuit court
to file a second petition for rehearing, because of a decision of
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 4 on October 19, 1943, over-
ruling an earlier decision that had been followed by the court of
appeals in affirming the judgment of the district court. Petition-
ers' motion was denied. On certiorari, the Supreme Court vac-
ated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case
for reconsideration under the recent rulings of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma. The Court reaffirmed Vandenbark, quoting
judgment became final in May, 1974. The rule 60(b) motion was filed in November,
1974. 518 F.2d at 722.
68 311 U.S. 538 (1941).
69 Id. at 543.
70 Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 110 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1940).
71 311 U.S. at 543 (footnote omitted).
72 322 U.S. 232 (1944).
73 Huddleston v. Dwyer, 137 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 232 (1944).
74 Wilson v. City of Hollis, 193 Okla. 241, 142 P.2d 633 (1943).
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the requirement that the federal courts apply recent decisional
law as long as the case remains subjudice.7
5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, interpreting
Huddleston in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. ,76 be-
lieved the Supreme Court to have "indicated that so long as the
case was 'subjudice' the court of appeals should have entertained
the petition for rehearing based on a change in state law; [the
Supreme Court] did not indicate, however, precisely what the
bounds of the term 'subjudice' might be."'77 In Braniff a change in
controlling state law occurred after entry of the judgment of the
court of appeals. After the time for petitioning for rehearing by
the court of appeals elapsed, petitioners filed a petition for cer-
tiorari; while that petition was still pending, they filed a motion
with the court of appeals for modification of the judgment or for
extension of the time to petition for rehearing. The court of
appeals held that it had power under rules 26(b) and 40 of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to extend the time to peti-
tion for rehearing and that it could modify an erroneous deci-
sion after the time for rehearing had expired. In addition, the
court believed that Huddleston required it to grant the petition
for rehearing and to consider the effect of the recent state
ruling.
78
Huddleston and Braniff read together do not necessarily ex-
tend indefinitely the period during which a case is sub judice. In
Huddleston, the change in state law came prior to expiration of
the time allowed for petitioning for certiorari,7 9 and the motion
for leave to file the second petition for rehearing was filed within
the sixty-day period by which the time for petitioning for cer-
tiorari could be extended.80 In Braniff, the motion for extension
of the time to petition for rehearing was filed before the petition
75 322 U.S. at 236.
76 424 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
77 Id. at 429.
78 Id. at 429-30.
79 When Huddleston was decided in 1943, the time allowed for petitioning for cer-
tiorari was "three months." Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 8(a), 43 Stat. 940, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970). Because the timely petition for rehearing filed by petitioners in
Huddleston suspended the finality of the court's judgment, Department of Banking v. Pink,
317 U.S. 264, 266 (1942), the announcement of the Oklahoma decision in October was
within the period allowed for petitioning for certiorari, which extended three months
from the denial of the first petition for rehearing on September 1.
80 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 8(a), 43 Stat. 940, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2101
(1970). The motion for leave was filed on December 17 which was within this extended
period. The Supreme Court in Huddleston heard the case after expiration of the initial
three-month period which began on September 1, see note 79 supra, and ended before
filing of the motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing.
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for certiorari was disposed of by the Supreme Court.81 In both
cases, then, review by the Supreme Court was still available short
of the rehearing process.
The Supreme Court's practice of granting rehearings from
its orders complicates the task of defining the time during which
a case is sub judice. In Conner v. Sinler,82 a diversity case, the
Court granted a rehearing on its prior denial of certiorari and
then vacated and remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to
consider the case in light of an Oklahoma Supreme Court deci-
sion handed down after the initial denial of certiorari. The
Court's lack of explanation makes its action in Conner
ambiguous, and a remand for consideration "in light of" is not a
command to apply the new decision. 83 Conner at least indicates
that denial of certiorari does not terminate irrevocably the re-
sponsibility of the federal courts to consider supervening state
decisions. But it may not be fruitful even to look to the deadline
for petitioning for rehearing on a denial of certiorari as an outer
limit for the period during which a case is subjudice, because the
Court on occasion has disregarded its own rules concerning
rehearings. 4
On the other hand, the Court in Vandenbark must have con-
templated some end to the period during which changes in state
law have to be implemented retroactively by the federal courts.
If a case were held to be sub judice whenever a motion pointing
out supervening changes in state law was filed, the concept "sub
judice" would become circular. A reasonable line might be drawn
when a case is denied certiorari or decided on certiorari8 5 such
that Supreme Court review is no longer available except through
the rehearing procedure.86 The cases themselves suggest that a
rule 60(b)(6) motion addressed to the lower federal courts after
this point may be inappropriate. Vandenbark, Huddleston, and
Braniff had not reached disposition by the Supreme Court; the
courts of appeals still had control over the cases and were held to
be required by Erie to apply the newly interpreted state law. In
Connors, on the other hand, the relief was requested after the
denial of certiorari and the petition was directed not to the lower
federal courts but to the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme
81 424 F.2d at 429.
82 367 U.S. 486 (1961), vacating and remanding 282 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1960).
8' See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 96 (1961).
8' Gondeck v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25 (1965).
85 Cf. Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
86 See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
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Court's rehearing of the case with the subsequent vacation and
remand appears to have been discretionary and the court of
appeals was not required to apply but only to consider the new
state opinion. If the case had still been subjudice, presumably the
court of appeals would have been bound to apply the new law
under Erie as interpreted in Vandenbark.87
In any event, the surprise and disruption that would result
from retroactive application of state law beyond this point may
outweigh the interest in exactly parallel application of state law. 88
In addition, because the state courts themselves might not apply
their recent decisions to judgments they entered years before the
change of law, discrimination might result between those who
choose the federal forum and those who choose to stay in the
state system in diversity cases. 89
Although it is difficult to fix a precise point signifying the
termination of the period during which a case is sub judice, the
period in Pierce was beyond the range of reasonableness. In
Pierce, the rule 60(b) motion was filed almost four years after the
judgment of the Tenth Circuit became final. 90 Moreover, during
the limited period following entry of judgment by the court of
appeals in which the federal courts arguably are bound to rec-
ognize supervening changes in state law, Huddleston and Braniff
indicate that relief is available through a petition for rehearing
addressed to the court of appeals. Normally rule 60(b) relief is
not available when other remedies exist.91 Relief under rule
60(b)(6), an extreme remedy, 92 is especially inappropriate in
these circumstances.
C. Role of Equitable Concerns
To say that Erie does not require relief under rule 60(b)(6)
on the facts of Pierce is not to deny that one of the policies
underlying Erie-preventing inequitable administration of the
laws 93-may be an adequate justification for allowing relief
under rule 60(b)(6) in a change of law situation. Accomplishing
justice in particular cases is a major concern of rule 60(b). In
fact, remedying the inequity of inconsistent treatment by the
87 311 U.S. at 543. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
88 See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, supra note 83, at 97.
89 But see note 60 supra.
90 518 F.2d at 722.
91 7 J. MooRE, supra note 8, 60.28[2], at 403; see Wharm, supra note 28, at 566.
92 Loucke v. United States, 21 F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
93 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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state and federal courts of parties to the same accident was a
second motivating force behind the Pierce opinion. The question
presented is whether Pierce truly is distinguishable on equitable
grounds from situations involving unconnected but similar acci-
dents, in which litigants in federal court are treated differently
from litigants in state courts or even litigants in the same federal
court at a later time, because of a supervening change in control-
ling law.
In reaching its decision in Pierce, the Tenth Circuit referred
specifically to the unfairness of inconsistent treatment only
briefly, by quoting from Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.94 In that case, petitioner was awarded death benefits by the
Department of Labor under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.95 The district court judgment set-
ting aside the award was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.96 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari97 and the following term de-
nied rehearing.98 The Fourth Circuit subsequently upheld an
award to the survivors of another employee killed in the same
accident.99 The Supreme Court then granted rehearing to the
survivors of the first employee, granted certiorari, and reversed
the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. Speaking of its deviation from
United States Supreme Court Rule 58(2) concerning rehearings,
the Court said: "[S]ince, of those eligible for compensation from
the accident, this petitioner stands alone in not receiving it, 'the
interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of
our rules.'"100 Judge Seth, dissenting in Pierce, may have been
correct in his observation that the Supreme Court in Gondeck was
simply acting in its supervisory capacity to require two circuits to
construe a federal statute consistently. 0' Yet the Court's lan-
guage in Gondeck does emphasize the peculiar inequity in the
different treatment of parties to the same event, which may have
entered into the Court's determination to abandon its own rules
and hear the case.'
0 2
Unfairness exists, however, in any case in which a superven-
94 382 U.S. 25, 27 (1965), quoted in 518 F.2d at 723.
95 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970).
96 299 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 382 U.S. 25 (1965).
97 370 U.S. 918 (1962).
98 371 U.S. 856 (1962).
99 Pan Am. world Airways, Inc. v. O'Hearne, 355 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965).
100 382 U.S. at 27 (quoting United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 99
(1957), quoted in 518 F.2d at 723.
101 518 F.2d at 726 (Seth, J., dissenting).
10
2 See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 519 (4th ed. 1969).
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ing change of controlling law, state or federal, results in the
incompatible treatment of persons similarly situated. 10 3 In fact,
two Justices of the Supreme Court found the equities more
compelling in an unrelated accident case, Weed v. Bilbrey,10 4 than
in Gondeck. In Weed, two men were killed in navigable waters in
Florida in unconnected accidents. Weed, a widow of one of the
men killed, was unsuccessful in the state courts with her claim
that maritime law afforded a cause of action for wrongful death.
The second widow, Moragne, litigated to the same conclusion in
the federal courts. Weed preceded Moragne to the Supreme
Court, but her first petition for certiorari was denied over three
dissents.10 5 Three weeks later, Moragne raised the same claim in
her petition for certiorari. Weed's petition for rehearing, asking
that her claim be heard with Moragne's, was denied. 0 6 Subse-
quently, certiorari was granted in the Moragne case.10 7 Weed was
denied leave to file a second petition for rehearing. 10 8 Thereaf-
ter, Moragne prevailed in the Supreme Court. 0 9 Justice Doug-
las, joined by Justice Black, dissented from the denial of Weed's
third petition for rehearing:
Every plaintiff who loses his claim cannot reinstate
his action when a rule of law favorable to him is de-
clared, either by the legislature or the court. But that is
not what is attempted here .... The facts of this case
are even more compelling than those in Gondeck ....
Moreover, had Mrs. Weed proceeded through the fed-
eral courts, or had she instituted her suit later, she
might have arrived in this Court after Mrs. Moragne. °
The majority's decision not to grant a rehearing in Weed,
despite having granted a rehearing in Gondeck, does not neces-
sarily imply that the majority disagreed with Justices Douglas
and Black on the issue of fairness. The results in the two cases
are reconcilable independently of the equities because Supreme
Court review was required in Gondeck to resolve a conflict in the
circuits"' but was unnecessary in Weed because the pertinent
103 Id.
104 400 U.S. 982, 984 (1970) (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
105 394 U.S. 1018 (1969) (Douglas, Black & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
106 395 U.S. 971 (1969).
107 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
108 397 U.S. 930 (1970).
109 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
110 400 U.S. at 984.
'" Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 726 (1975) (Seth, J., dissenting); see text
accompanying note 101 supra.
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legal issue was raised in Moragne. 12 The position of the dissent-
ing Justices in Weed suggests that an unrelated accident case may
present as strong a case for relief as a related accident case like
Gondeck or Pierce. At least, the subjective perception that denial
of relief would result in greater unfairness to the moving party
in a related accident case than in an unrelated accident case is
not sufficiently persuasive to establish the former as an extraor-
dinary situation as a matter of law.
If the distinction between cases of related and unrelated
accidents in terms of fairness to the unsuccessful party is too
amorphous to justify an exception to the general practice of not
allowing rule 60(b) relief in a change of law situation, perhaps
the Pierce decision may be justified by the differing degrees of
prejudice to the prevailing party occasioned by granting relief in
the two types of cases. In the Pierce situation, the defendant
secured a favorable judgment in the federal courts earlier than
in the state courts. His expectations about the finality of the
federal judgment may have been less crystalized than those of a
prevailing party who had all claims growing out of the same
event litigated in a single court. The split litigation in Pierce may
have given rise to a sense of nonfinality until all adjudication
arising from the accident had been consummated. When per-
ceptions of finality are still tentative, setting aside a judgment
rendered early in the course of multiple-action litigation on the
basis of later determinations may be considered not to encroach
severely upon the interest in finality of judgments.
The subjective sense of unfairness to the unsuccessful party
in a related accident case and the absence of substantial prej-
udice to the prevailing party are probably necessary but not suf-
ficient to justify the holding in Pierce. In Ackernann,11 3 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of rule 60(b)(6) relief
to the petitioner from a denaturalization decree even though the
denaturalization judgment against the petitioner's relative, is-
sued in the same proceeding, had been reversed on appeal. The
petitioner claimed that he had been unable to appeal because of
financial hardship, but the Court regarded the decision not to
"1
2 See also United States v. Maryland ex rel. Meyer, 382 U.S. 158 (1965), in which
the Court granted leave to file a conditional petition for rehearing pending the Court's
decision in Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, vacated, 382 U.S. 159
(1965), which involved a conflicting decision by another circuit growing out of the same
accident, and then reversed after deciding Levin. The Court decided to hear both cases
because they not only involved a common accident but were litigated on a single record.
381 U.S. at 43.
113 Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
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appeal as a free choice and therefore fatal to his plea for
relief.114 Thus, Ackernann involved disparate treatment of per-
sons who not only were similarly situated but whose denaturali-
zation decrees were issued in the same judicial proceeding, when
little prejudice would have resulted to the prevailing party, the
Government, had relief been granted.
The court in Pierce may also have been concerned with the
element of free choice." 5 The majority notes twice in its opinion
that plaintiffs were "forced" into the federal forum where they
could not utilize the "strategem" of urging that state precedent
be overruled that the plaintiff employed in the state courts."
6
Judge Barrett would have voted to deny relief had the plaintiffs
chosen the federal forum in the first instance." 7 In fact, Judge
Barrett would grant rule 60(b)(6) relief to a party who did not
voluntarily choose the federal forum whenever that party would
have prevailed in state court, apparently even in an unrelated
accident case." 8
It is difficult to say, then, just what rule Pierce purports to
announce. The mere fact of divergent results in state and fed-
eral courts in cases arising from the same accident, singled out
by the majority as the distinguishing feature of the case,"19 may
not be sufficient to merit relief under rule 60(b)(6). The absence
of free choice in being in the federal forum may have been a
critical factor in the determination to grant relief. Countervailing
considerations may require the denial of relief even in a related
accident case. The presumption that the prevailing party's ex-
pectations of finality are weaker in a related accident case than
in an unrelated accident case may be refuted by actions taken in
reliance on the first judgment. In addition, when the party pre-
vailing in the first decision in parallel suits growing out of a
common catastrophe is not a party to the second suit, his expec-
tations about the finality of his judgment are substantial, because
litigation terminated for him with the first judgment. Finally,
Collins v. City of Wichita,' 20 distinguished in Pierce as a case involv-
114Id. at 198.
I" In Pierce the absence of freedom was in the choice of forum, not the decision
whether to appeal.
116 518 F.2d at 723.
" Id. at 724-25 (Barrett, J., concurring); see text accompanying notes 65 & 66
supra.
118 518 F.2d at 724-25.
"'Id. at 723.
120 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
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ing unrelated transactions, 121 concerned property rights whose
existence in a case involving related transactions might make
rule 60(b)(6) relief inequitable.
Although the decision in Pierce might not have been im-
peachable as an abuse of discretion if handed down by a district
court, the decision of the court of appeals is not persuasive as a
matter of law. It is by no means clear which facts, if any, consti-
tuted the extraordinary situation prerequisite to relief under
rule 60(b)(6).
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether relief should be granted under rule 60(b)(6) when
inconsistent results are reached in state and federal courts in
suits arising from a common catastrophe is still an open question
after Pierce. Such relief is not barred by the requirement that
grounds for relief under clause (6) be exclusive of grounds
covered by clauses (1)-(5), nor by the prohibition of the use of
rule 60(b) as a substitute for appeal, if relief is granted after the
case has been heard on appeal. On the other hand, such relief is
not required by Erie beyond a limited time after entry of the
judgment of a court of appeals, and within that time alternate
remedies are available. Consequently, if an exception is to be
made to the general rule against rule 60(b)(6) relief from judg-
ments in a change of law situation, it must be based on equitable
grounds. Although a presumption that expectations of finality
are weak in common catastrophe litigation might weigh in favor
of relief in a case like Pierce, a just decision can only be reached
by a careful balancing of all the competing equities in a particu-
lar case.
121 518 F.2d at 722-23.
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